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Abstract
This paper constructs a two-region endogenous growth model with
productive government expenditure to analyze the relationship be-
tween regional redistribution of public input and the welfare of resi-
dents in each region. This paper shows that the redistribution policy
may be Pareto improving if the distribution rate of a more populous
region is increased because it raises the equilibrium growth rate. Fur-
thermore, the higher the inequalities between the labor populations
are, the greater the possibility of a Pareto improving policy.
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1 Introduction
Why does an increase in regional disparities cause some serious problems?
Some insist that regional inequalities hurt immobile residents in the poorer
regions, others state that an agglomeration of efficient regions has positive
externalities. Thus, although issues about regional inequalities have been
controversial for a long time, there have only been a few theoretical studies.
Furthermore, despite limited theoretical understanding, in many countries
inter-regional redistribution policies that include tied and untied subsidies
are believed to be justified, as well as income redistribution policies between
individuals. Therefore, it is important to construct a theoretical model in
terms of regional inequalities and resident welfare.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the
inter-regional redistribution of government expenditure and the welfare of
residents in each region. Barro (1990) first formulated an endogenous growth
model that incorporated public services as a productive input into private
production. This paper extends Barro to two regions and examines a redis-
tribution policy between the regions. Since Barro, although there are many
endogenous growth models with productive public expenditure,1 there has
been hardly any extension to two-region or multi-region models.
This paper is also related to the literature on international economics
that has examined effects of transfers on welfare. They have examined three
effects when the transfer is done. The first is the normal case, in which a
donor becomes worse off and a recipient becomes better off. The second is
that a donor becomes better off and a recipient becomes worse off, called the
transfer paradox. The third is that both of them are better (worse) off, called
Pareto improving (worsening). Although these studies are closely related to
our model, they are almost all static2 and has supposed that the transfers
have no effect on productivity.3
The structure of our model is similar to the models that analyze the
relationship between the composition of public expenditure and economic
growth in a one-region endogenous growth model, such as Devarajan et al.
1See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Futagami et al. (1993), Glomm and Ravikumar
(1994), Turnovsky (1996), and others.
2In international economics, there are many studies that analyze the relationship be-
tween forms of aid and welfare, for example Bhagwati et al. (1982). Ihori (1996) introduces
public goods that are voluntarily provided to these frameworks.
3By way of exception, Galor and Polemarchakis (1987) analyze the existence of a trans-
fer paradox in an overlapping generations model, and Yanagihara (1998) extends Galor
and Polemarchakis to introduce public goods that have externalities only on domestic
private production. However, those studies are not endogenous growth models in which
there is a possibility that the transfer affects an equilibrium growth rate.
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(1996) and Davoodi et al. (1998, 1999). They have shown that a change in
the composition of public expenditure leads to an increase in the equilibrium
growth rate. Thus, it is possible to say that our model is a two-region and
multi-region expansion of their model.
However, our model is distinct from others in the respect that it incorpo-
rates an inter-regional redistribution policy and a simple endogenous growth
model. Moreover, this is the first paper to investigate Pareto improving
public policy in a two-region Barro’s framework.4
The main results in this paper are as follows. A redistribution policy may
be Pareto improving if the distribution rate of the more populated region is
raised. On the contrary, it may be Pareto worsening if the distribution rate
of the less populated region is raised. Furthermore, the higher the inequali-
ties in labor population between the regions are, the possibility of a Pareto
improving policy is more enhanced. This is because a change in the dis-
tribution rate has effects not only on initial consumption, but also on the
economy-wide growth rate, which has a positive correlation with a change in
the distribution rate as long as that of the more populous region is raised.
The reasons why the economy-wide growth rate increases are because of scale
effects in endogenous growth models5 and spillover effects in government ex-
penditure. Moreover, we extend this model to a multi-regional case. Similar
to the two-region case, we show the possibility for Pareto improvement if the
distribution rate of regions with higher than average population is raised.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The basic model is
presented in Section 2. Section 3 examines comparative statics with respect
to policy variables of governments. Section 4 analyses the welfare effect
of changes in the distribution rate and shows the possibility of a Pareto
improving policy. Section 5 briefly considers the case of a lump-sum transfer.
Section 6 extends the model to a multi-region model. Section 7 discusses the
implications and concludes this paper.
2 The model
We first present the basic structure of the model. There are two regions,
regions 1 and 2, in a country. The country has a central government that
collects taxes from individuals in each region and distributes them to local
governments, which supply local public goods that enhance productivity as
4Martin (1999) and Martin and Ottaviano (1999) have a similar idea to ours, but the
structure of their models are more complicated since they consider industrial geography
and they have analyzed public policies that lower intra- or inter-regional transaction costs.
5See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for more detail.
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an externality in each region. The regions produce a homogeneous good and
they are identical except for their initial assets and labor populations. We
assume that capital is perfectly mobile between regions, but labor migration
is prohibited.
2.1 Firms
Following Barro(1990), the production sector in each region has a linearly
homogeneous production function, that is
Yi = F (Ki, GiLi), i = 1, 2, (1)
where Yi is output in region i, Ki is physical capital devoted to the production
sector, Gi is local government expenditure in each region, and Li denotes
labor, which is identified as the size of the population, and is constant over
time.
By taking the price of the good as numeraire, let ri, wi represent the
rent on capital and the wage in region i, respectively. Since the production
function in each region is linearly homogeneous, we can express the profit
maximization problem of competitive firms as follows:
ri = f
′(ki), (2)
wi =
[
f(ki)
ki
− f ′(ki)
]
Ki
Li
= ω(ki)
Ki
Li
. (3)
In the above equations, ki ≡ Ki/LiGi is the quantity of capital per unit
of effective labor, ω(ki) = f(ki)/ki − f ′(ki) and f(ki) = F (Ki/LiGi, 1). We
assume that f(ki) satisfies the standard neoclassical properties and the Inada
conditions:
f ′(ki) > 0, f ′′(ki) < 0, lim
ki→0
f ′(ki) =∞, lim
ki→∞
f ′(ki) = 0.
where f ′ and f ′′ denote the first derivative and the second derivative with
respect to the argument of the function, respectively.
2.2 Households
We assume that many identical households live in two regions and that each
household provides its assets in both regions and inelastically one unit of la-
bor in the region where they live. The objective function of the representative
household in region i is
4
∫ ∞
0
u(ci)e
−ρtdt, (4)
where ci is the per capita consumption of the household in region i and ρ is
the constant rate of time preference. The felicity function is assumed to take
the constant relative risk aversion form:
u(ci) =
c1−σi
1− σ , for σ > 0, σ = 1, (5)
= ln ci, for σ = 1, (6)
where σ is the degree of relative risk aversion (the reciprocal of the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution), which is assumed to be a positive constant.
Due to the perfect capital mobility between the regions, a no-arbitrage
condition r1 = r2 = r must always hold without the case of the corner
solution. Thus, the flow budget constraint of the household in region i is
a˙i = (1− τ)(rai + wi)− ci, (7)
where ai, τ denotes the total asset per capita in region i, the rate of flat-rate
income tax, respectively.6 Given the amount of initial holdings ai(0) > 0, the
household maximizes (4) subject to (7). It is assumed that the household
is endowed with perfect foresight, and it accurately anticipates the whole
sequences of real rents {r(t)}∞t=0 and the wage rate {wi(t)}∞t=0. As a result
of the utility maximization problem of the household endowed with perfect
foresight, the optimal consumption path and the transversality condition are
given by
c˙i
ci
=
1
σ
[(1− τ)r∗ − ρ] , (8)
lim
t→∞
λi(t)ai(t)e
−ρt = 0, (9)
where λ represents the co-state variable of ai.
6A dot above a variable represents taking the time-derivative.
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2.3 Governments
There are three governments in the economy. The central government levies
flat-rate income taxes in each region.7 The budget constraints of each gov-
ernment read
G = τ(Y1 + Y2), (10)
G1 = βG, G2 = (1− β)G, β ∈ (0, 1), (11)
where G is the central government’s revenue (total tax revenue in the econ-
omy8), Gi is the local government expenditure in each region, and β is the
distribution rate for region 1. For simplicity, we assume that τ and β are
time-invariant and that distribution from the central government is tied to
government expenditure.9 Moreover, note that equations (10) and (11) mean
that each government runs a balanced budget.
2.4 Market equilibrium
There are two integrated markets, asset and goods,10 and two disintegrated
markets, labor in each region, in the economy. Each market equilibrium is
described by
A1 + A2 = K1 + K2, (12)
Y1 + Y2 = C1 + C2 + K˙1 + K˙2 + G1 + G2, (13)
where A1 and A2 respectively denote the aggregate assets in regions 1 and 2.
Let us next define the new variable x which represents the GDP ratio
(Y2/Y1), then from (1), (11) the quantity of capital per unit of effective labor
in each region is as follows:
k1 = f
−1
(
1
βL1τ(1 + x)
)
, (14)
k2 = f
−1
(
1
(1− β)L2τ(1 + x−1)
)
. (15)
7The details of other taxation methods are given in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)
8For the sake of an exhaustion of product, Yi = rKi+wiLi holds in each region. Using
the flow budget constraint of the household and asset market clearing condition, we derive
(10).
9If the distribution includes tied and untied forms, the result in this paper would still
hold.
10Equities are the only financial asset in the economy.
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ri
x
r∗
r1(x)
r2(x)
x∗
Figure 1: ri − x plane
Although the rent on physical capital in Barro’s model, which is for one
region with no distribution policy, could be derived in the form of simple
AK technology, in our model this depends on the GDP ratio x. Figure 1
illustrates the rent on physical capital in each region, and it indicates that r1
is monotonically increasing in x and r2 is monotonically decreasing in x.
11
As mentioned above, because the no-arbitrage condition always holds,
r1 = r2 ⇔ k1 = k2 holds in equilibrium, and then, the equilibrium ratio x
can be determined as follows.
x∗ = (1− β)L2/βL1, (16)
k∗ = f−1
(
1
τ [βL1 + (1− β)L2]
)
, (17)
r∗ = f ′(k∗), (18)
ω∗ = f(k∗)/k∗ − f ′(k∗), (19)
where the asterisk denotes an equilibrium value. From (16) through (19), we
show that the equilibrium value r∗ and ω∗ are time-invariant since x∗ and k∗
are time-invariant.
11The second order condition, the sign of ∂2ri/∂x2 depends on the functional form.
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2.5 Steady-growth equilibrium
We let γ∗ be a steady-growth rate and in a steady-growth equilibrium, the
economy is characterized by
γ∗ ≡ C˙i
Ci
=
K˙i
Ki
=
A˙
A
=
Y˙i
Yi
=
G˙i
Gi
,
where all variables are at the aggregate level, and A ≡ A1 + A2 denotes
the economy-wide assets. Let us examine the existence and stability of the
steady-growth equilibrium. From (10), (12), (13) and recalling that Y =
(r + ω)A, we obtain
A˙ = (1− τ)(r∗ + ω∗)A− C, (20)
where C ≡ C1 + C2 represents the economy-wide consumption level. Define
a new variable z as C/A, then from (8) and (20) we have the dynamics with
respect to z:
z˙ = χ(z)
≡ z
(
1
σ
((1− τ)r∗ − ρ)− (1− τ)(r∗ + ω∗) + z
)
.
We can easily verify that χ(z) = 0 has a unique positive solution, denoted
by z∗, if and only if
ρ
σ
+ (1− τ)
(
f(k∗)
k∗
− f
′(k∗)
σ
)
> 0. (21)
Figure 2 depicts the graph of χ when (21) holds. In this graph, it is shown
that z∗ is globally unstable and hence the steady-growth equilibrium in this
model uniquely exists. This implies that the economy has no transitional
dynamics and is always in a steady-growth equilibrium.
3 Comparative statics
In this section, we consider the impacts of an unanticipated permanent in-
crease in β and τ . The effects of changes in β and τ are summarized as
follows:
8
z˙zz∗o
Figure 2: Graph of χ
dγ∗
dβ
= −1
σ
(1− τ)f
′′(k∗)
f ′(k∗)
L1 − L2
τ [βL1 + (1− β)L2]2 , (22)
dx∗
dβ
= − L2
β2L1
< 0, (23)
dγ∗
dτ
=
1
σ
[
−(1− τ)f
′′(k∗)
f ′(k∗)
1
τ 2[βL1 + (1− β)L2] − r
∗
]
, (24)
dx∗
dτ
= 0. (25)
Proposition 1. It is true that
a. by increasing the distribution rate to the more populated region, the
steady-growth rate can be enhanced.
b. since the central government levies the same tax rate on both regions,
regional inequalities cannot be reduced by a tax policy.
Proof. See the equations from (22) to (25).
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4 Welfare analysis (Pareto improving policy)
In this section, we examine the welfare effect in changing the distribution rate.
The redistribution policy between regions would be justified if it enhanced
the welfare of residents in less populated regions. We first predict the level
of the consumption at time t in each region.
The budget constraint of households in the aggregate in region i is
A˙i(t) = (1− τ)(r∗Ai(t) + wi(t)Li)− ci(t)Li.
By solving the first order differential equation with respect to Ai(t), the
initial consumption in region i is given by12
ci(0) = −φ
[
ai(0) + (1− τ)
∫ ∞
0
wi(t)e
−(1−τ)r∗tdt
]
, (26)
where φ ≡ (1/σ − 1)(1− τ)r∗ − ρ/σ < 0.
Substituting (3), (12) and (19) into (26), we obtain:13
c1(0) = −φa1(0) + 1
1 + x∗
1
L1
(1− τ)ω∗A(0), (27)
c2(0) = −φa2(0) + x
∗
1 + x∗
1
L2
(1− τ)ω∗A(0). (28)
Thus the initial consumption depends on the initial asset (the first term
in (27) and (28)) and the lifetime wage (the second term in (27) and (28)).
In other words, the greater the initial asset or the lifetime wage is, the more
the initial consumption is. Furthermore, the lifetime wage depends on GDP
ratio (capital ratio) since it increases with capital invested where they live in
an endogenous growth model.14
For the sake of simplicity, suppose that the rate of the relative risk aver-
sion σ = 1, that is, the utility function is logarithmic. Further suppose that
the production technology of the firms takes a Cobb-Douglas form, hence
Yi = K
α
i (GiLi)
1−α, α ∈ (0, 1),
12See appendix in detail.
13The derivation of (27) and (28) is in the appendix.
14In equilibrium, GDP ratio equals to capital ratio completely.
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where α represents the distribution rate of capital.15 Let us now define the
welfare function in each region. The welfare over an infinite planning horizon
of the household in region i (Wi) can be written as:
Wi =
∫ ∞
0
ln ci(t)e
−ρtdt,
=
1
ρ
ln ci(0) +
1
ρ2
γ∗. (29)
Let us now differentiate (29) with respect to β, in other words, we consider
the welfare effects when the distribution rate to region 1 rises. For this
operation the welfare effects on rising β are given by
dWi
dβ
=
1
ρ
1
ci(0)
dci(0)
dβ
+
1
ρ2
dγ∗
dβ
. (30)
Equation (30) reveals that the welfare effect of a rise in β includes two dis-
tinct components. One, the first term on the right-hand side, is the initial
consumption effect. It reflects whether the initial consumption of the resi-
dents in each region increases or not, by raising the distribution rate to region
1. The other, the second term on the right-hand side, is the economy-wide
growth effect. It represents the effect of a rise in β on the steady-growth rate.
As mentioned in proposition 1, this effect is always positive if and only if
the labor population in region 1 is greater than that of region 2. Therefore,
we have only to focus on the initial consumption effect. It can be derived as
follows:
dc1(0)
dβ
=
1− α
α
A(0)ψ [(1− α)β(L1 − L2) + αL2] , (31)
dc2(0)
dβ
=
1− α
α
A(0)ψ [(1− α)(1− β)(L1 − L2)− αL1] , (32)
where ψ ≡ (1−τ)τ 1−αα B 1−3αα , B ≡ βL1+(1−β)L2, respectively. Furthermore,
in the case of the log-linear utility function, the initial consumption effect is
divided into two components, both of which are linked to the lifetime wage.
One, the first term in the square bracket on the right-hand side of equations
(31) and (32), is the wage growth effect. It captures the effect of the wage
increases with an economy-wide growth rate. The other, the second term in
15In the Cobb-Douglas case, the variables in equilibrium are given in appendix.
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the bracket on the right-hand side, is the productivity effect. It means that
a rise in the distribution rate (a rise in β) makes region 1 more attractive
for investment since it enhances the productivity of capital in region 1. The
wage growth effect is positive in both regions because we suppose L1 > L2.
However, the productivity effect is positive in region 1 but negative in region
2. From the above argument we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the case that region 1 is more populous than region 2, a
policy which increases the distribution rate in region 1 (region 2) is Pareto
improving (Pareto worsening) if and only if L2/L1 ≤ Φ(L2/L1).
Proof. We first consider the effect of a steady-growth rate. By assuming
region 1 is more populous, a rise in β enhances the steady-growth rate, that
is dγ∗/dβ > 0. Next, the two effects on the initial consumption in region 1
have the same sign (both positive), hence dW1/dβ > 0 from (31). On the
other hand, those in region 2 have the opposite sign; that is, the wage growth
effect is positive and the productivity effect is negative. Hence, the sign of
dW2/dβ is ambiguous because of this trade-off. The necessary and sufficient
condition for a Pareto improving policy (dW2/dβ ≥ 0) is as follows:
L2
L1
≤ 1− α
(1− α)(1− β)
[
1 + 1
ρ
(1− τ)r∗
]
+ a2(0)
A(0)
αB
≡ Φ
(
L2
L1
)
. (33)
In the equation (33), they are variables r∗, A(0), B that depends on L2/L1,
and they are monotonically increasing in L2/L1. Therefore, the sign of
dΦ(·)/d(L2/L1) is ambiguous, but as a result of the numerical analysis, unless
the parameters are extraordinary, Φ is increasing in L2/L1.
16
Then it is useful for us to investigate the sufficient condition for the Pareto
improving policy, which is dc2(0)/dβ ≥ 0 if and only if17
L2
L1
≤ 1− α
(1− α)(1− β) . (34)
From the equation (33), we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The possibility of a Pareto improving policy is greater in the
following cases:
16See appendix.
17Figure 4 shows the region for the Pareto improving policy.
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L2
L1
RHS or LHS
O
1
necessary and sufficient
LHS
sufficient
RHS
Figure 3: Region for a Pareto improving policy
a. when the disparity of the labor population between regions (L1/L2) is
greater.
b. when the tax rate is closer to the growth-maximizing tax rate.
Proof. The proof of item a. is shown in Figure 3, as a result of the numerical
analysis.18 The proof of item b. is that the growth-maximizing tax rate is
given by ∂γ∗/∂τ = 0 ⇔ ∂(1 − τ)r∗/∂τ = 0. In other words, when τ = τ∗,
the right hand side of the equation (33) is the maximum, where τ∗ is the
growth-maximizing tax rate.
Let us next consider a more generalized case, σ = 1, in which the utility
function takes the CRRA form. The welfare functions in each region are
given by:
18We assumed that L1 > L2. Hence higher disparity of a labor population corresponds
to a lower L2/L1.
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Wi =
∫ ∞
0
ci(t)
1−σ
1− σ e
−ρtdt,
=
ci(0)
1−σ
(1− σ)[ρ− (1− σ)γ∗] . (35)
Partially differentiating (35) with respect to β, we obtain
dc1(0)
dβ
= ψ
{(
1− 1
σ
)
a1(0)(L1 − L2)B + 1− α
α
A(0) [(1− α)β(L1 − L2) + αL2]
}
,
dc2(0)
dβ
= ψ
{(
1− 1
σ
)
a2(0)(L1 − L2)B + 1− α
α
A(0) [(1− α)(1− β)(L1 − L2)− αL1]
}
.
There is a slight difference from the log-linear utility function case in that the
other effect, the first term on the right hand side, exists. We call this effect
the consumption propensity effect which has the same sign as the economy-
wide growth effect. Hence, the possibility of a Pareto improving policy is
greater than in the log-linear utility function case.
5 The model with lump-sum transfers
In this section, preserving the basic structure of the model, we consider a
simpler distribution form, which is a lump-sum income transfer. Suppose
that the transfer T of the aggregate amount is done from region 2 to region
1. As is well known, the subjective equilibrium condition is not affected by
the lump-sum transfers. The aggregate budget constraints of the household
in each region change as follows:
A˙1(t) = (1− τ)(r∗A1(t) + w1(t)L1)− c1(t)L1 + T,
A˙2(t) = (1− τ)(r∗A2(t) + w2(t)L2)− c2(t)L2 − T.
If we solve the ordinary differential equation for ci(0), we can derive
c1(0) = −φ
[
a1(0) +
T
(1− τ)r∗L1
]
+
1− α
α
1
1 + x∗
1
L1
(1− τ)r∗A(0),
c2(0) = −φ
[
a2(0)− T
(1− τ)r∗L2
]
+
1− α
α
x∗
1 + x∗
1
L2
(1− τ)r∗A(0).
14
The initial consumption in each region depends on initial assets, the amount
of the lump-sum transfer, and the lifetime wage. Then, we examine the effects
on welfare of changes in the lump-sum transfer. For simplicity, assume that
σ = 1, and the following equation is obtained:
dWi
dT
=
1
ρ
1
ci(0)
dci(0)
dT
+
1
ρ2
dγ∗
dT
. (36)
From the equation (36) we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 4. There is no possibility of a Pareto improving policy in the
case of a lump-sum income transfer.
Proof. The effects on welfare are of two types, which are the initial consump-
tion effect and the economy-wide growth effect. The latter effect is zero, hence
dγ∗/dT = 0, since the effect of the lump-sum transfer on the steady-growth
rate is neutral. Let us next examine its effect on the composition of initial
consumption. Although it is easily seen that there is no wage growth effect
and no productivity effect, a new effect of the lump-sum transfer emerges.
Therefore, we have only to contemplate this effect. The equation (36) changes
into
dW1(0)
dT
= − φ
(1− τ)r∗L1 > 0, (37)
dW2(0)
dT
=
φ
(1− τ)r∗L2 < 0. (38)
From equations (37) and (38), we have shown proposition.
6 Multi-regional extension
This model can easily be extended to a multi-region model. Consider an
economy with n regions: i = 1, · · · , n. We assume that βi denotes a share
of government expenditure to region i, then the budget constraints of each
government are changed as follows:
G = τ
n∑
i=1
Yi, (39)
Gi = βiG, (40)
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where
∑n
i=1 βi = 1. Equations (39) and (40) respectively represent the bud-
get constraints of the central government and the local government in region
i. The profit maximization of firms and the utility maximization of house-
holds remain basically unchanged, and each market equilibrium condition is
given by
n∑
i=1
Ai =
n∑
i=1
Ki, (41)
n∑
i=1
Yi =
n∑
i=1
Ci +
n∑
i=1
K˙i + G, (42)
where (41) and (42) denote the integrated asset market and goods market,
respectively.
Let us next define the new variable si which represents the GDP share
(Yi/
∑n
k=1 Yk) in region i, then from (40) the quantity of capital per unit of
effective labor in region i is as follows:
ki = f
−1
(
si
τβiLi
)
.
From the no-arbitrage condition, ki = kj holds for all i, j, i = j. Hence,
the variables in equilibrium are given by
s∗i =
βiLi∑n
k=1 βkLk
,
k∗ = f−1
(
1
τ
∑n
k=1 βkLk
)
,
r∗ = f ′(k∗),
ω∗ = f(k∗)/k∗ − f ′(k∗).
As in the two-region model, we turn to examine the comparative statics. But
in advance, we must determine the rule of the redistribution policy.
Assumption 1. The increase in the share of region i on a minute scale
equals the decrease in that of other regions, that is, Δβi = −
∑n
j =i Δβj. For
simplicity, we assume that the decrease in the share is the same amount in
all regions except for region i, hence Δβj = Δβ¯ for all j = i.
16
Owing to the above assumption, we can derive the results on the com-
parative statics with respect to βi as follows:
19
dγ∗
dβi
= −1
σ
(1− τ)f
′′(k∗)
f ′(k∗)
1
τ(
∑n
k=1 βkLk)
2
(
Li − 1
n− 1
n∑
j =i
Lj
)
, (43)
ds∗i
dβi
=
1∑n
k=1 βkLk
(
(1− s∗i )Li +
si
n− 1
n∑
j =i
Lj
)
> 0, (44)
ds∗j
dβi
=
1∑n
k=1 βkLk
(
− Lj
n− 1 − s
∗
j
(
Li − 1
n− 1
n∑
j =i
Lj
))
< 0. (45)
Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The steady-growth rate can be enhanced if and only if the
share of government expenditure to the region which is more populous than
the average for the remaining regions is increased.
Proof. According to the equation (43), dγ∗/dβi > 0 ⇔ Li >
∑
i=j Lj/(n −
1).
The equation (43) represents a multi-region case of the equation (22), and
the equation (44) and (45) mean that an increase in the distribution rate of
the region i leads to an increase (decrease) in the GDP share of the region i
(region j).
As in the two-region model, we specify the production function of firms
as the Cobb-Douglas.20 Let us next derive the initial consumption by using
the asset market clearing condition. The same operation in the two-region
model leads to the following equation.
ci(0) = −φai(0) + 1− α
α
1
Li
(1− τ)r∗s∗iA(0), (46)
which holds for all i. Thereafter we differentiate (46) with respect to βi, in
other words, we examine the effects of an increase in the share of region i on
the welfare within the region and in the other regions. Suppose again that
σ = 1, then we obtain
dWi
dβi
=
1
ρ
1
ci(0)
dci(0)
dβi
+
1
ρ2
dγ∗
dβi
. (47)
19The derivation of equations (43), (44) and (45) is in the appendix.
20Each variable in equilibrium is given in the appendix.
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We have already investigated the economy-wide growth effect (dγ∗/dβi) in
the above comparative statics. Therefore we have only to consider the two
initial consumption effects. (dci(0)/dβi and dcj(0)/dβi, j = i) They can be
rewritten as:
dci(0)
dβi
=
1− α
α
Ψβiζ
1−3α
α
(
α
[(
1− s∗i
s∗i
)
Li + L¯
]
+ (1− α)(Li − L¯)
)
dcj(0)
dβi
=
1− α
α
Ψβjζ
1−3α
α
(
−α
[
(Li − L¯) + 1
n− 1
ζ
βj
]
+ (1− α)(Li − L¯)
)
where Ψ ≡ (1− τ)τ 1−αα A(0), ζ ≡∑nk=1 βkLk, L¯ ≡ 1n−1 ∑nj =i Lj , respectively.
Thus we can find the following proposition similar to the two-region model.
Proposition 6. In the multi-region model, the policy that increases the share
of government expenditure to region i may be Pareto improving if region i is
more populous than the average of the other regions.
Proof. We follow almost the same procedure as in the two-region model.21
By assuming that region i is more populous than the average, a rise in βi
enhances the economy-wide growth rate, that is dγ∗/dβi > 0. Next, the
two effects on the initial consumption in region i have the same sign (both
positive), hence dWi/dβi > 0. On the other hand, those in region j have the
opposite sign, that is, the wage growth effect is positive and the productivity
effect is negative. Hence, the sign of dWj/dβi is ambiguous because of this
trade-off. The necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto improving
policy (dWj/dβi ≥ 0) is as follows:
L¯
Li
≤ 1− α
[(n− 1)(1− 2α) + D]
Lj
sj
,
where
D ≡ aj(0)
A(0)
Lj
sj
+
1
ρ
1− α
α
(1− τ)r∗.
Then it is useful for us to investigate the sufficient condition for the Pareto
improving policy, that is, dcj(0)/dβi ≥ 0 if and only if
21We pay attention to analyzing the Pareto improving policy in the multi-region model
because we must check welfare in all regions. However, supposing that all regions are
symmetric except for the labor population and GDP share, it is a sufficient condition
of the possibility for the Pareto improving policy to assume that the region j is the
least populous and has the biggest GDP share, which is Lj = min{L1, L2, · · · , Ln} and
sj = max{s1, s2, · · · , sn}.
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L¯Li
≤ 1− α
(n− 1)(1− 2α)
1
sj
Lj
Li
.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have constructed a two-region endogenous growth model
with government expenditure, and theoretically explored the relationship be-
tween the regional redistribution policy of public input and the welfare of the
residents in each region. We have shown that there is a possibility of Pareto
improvement if the policy is for redistribution from the less populous region
to the more populous region because it raises the equilibrium growth rate.
Furthermore, this paper has extended a two-region model to a multi-region
one, and has been successful in providing an analytical solution. This exten-
sion is highly fruitful and rewarding when we make policy recommendations.
In spite of our contributions, the possibility of further extension remains
for future research. First, we have assumed no congestion costs of govern-
ment expenditure. If these are taken into consideration, our results may be
modified. Second, we have taken the regional share of government expendi-
ture as given. It is much more fruitful to incorporate a framework of political
decisions into our model.
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of (26)
We solve the ordinary differential equation with respect to Ai(t).
e−(1−τ)r
∗t[A˙i(t)− (1− τ)r∗Ai(t)] = e−(1−τ)r∗t[(1− τ)wi(t)Li − ci(t)Li](A.1)
Integrating both sides within [0,∞), we derive
[
e−(1−τ)r
∗tAi(t)
]∞
0
=
∫ ∞
0
e−(1−τ)r
∗t[(1− τ)wi(t)Li − ci(t)Li]dt(A.2)
lim
t→∞
e−(1−τ)r
∗tAi(t)− Ai(0) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(1−τ)r
∗t[(1− τ)wi(t)Li − ci(t)Li]dt(A.3)
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The first term on the left hand side is 0 from the transversality condition.
Then, using the Euler equation, we find ci(t) = ci(0)e
γ∗t. Substituting this
into (A.3), we can get
ci(0)
∫ ∞
0
e[γ
∗−(1−τ)r∗]tdt = ai(0) + (1− τ)
∫ ∞
0
e−(1−τ)r
∗twi(t)dt (A.4)
Let us now define the new variable φ as follows:
φ ≡ γ∗ − (1− τ)r∗ (A.5)
=
1
σ
[(1− τ)r∗ − ρ]− (1− τ)r∗ (A.6)
=
(
1
σ
− 1
)
(1− τ)r∗ − ρ
σ
< 0 (A.7)
Then ci(0) can be rewritten by
ci(0) = −φ
[
ai(0) + (1− τ)
∫ ∞
0
wi(t)e
−(1−τ)r∗tdt
]
(A.8)
A.2 Derivation of (27) and (28)
Because of no transitional dynamics, the second term in the right hand side
(wi(t)) of equation (26) is
wi(t) = ω
∗Ki(t)
Li
. (A.9)
Using the asset market equilibrium condition (12), the equation (A.9) can
be rewritten as
K1(t) =
1
1 + x∗
A(0)eγ
∗t.
By the same operation, the condition in region 2 is given by
K2(t) =
1 + x∗
x∗
A(0)eγ
∗t.
Thus, we can derive the equilibrium wage as follows:
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w1(t) =
1
1 + x∗
1
L1
ω∗A(0)eγ
∗t, (A.10)
w2(t) =
x∗
1 + x∗
1
L2
ω∗A(0)eγ
∗t. (A.11)
Substituting equations (A.10) and (A.11) into the initial consumption (26),
we obtain (27) and (28).
A.3 Cobb-Douglas specification (two-region model)
x∗ =
(1− β)L2
βL1
r∗ = ατ
1−α
α [βL1 + (1− β)L2]
1−α
α
γ∗ =
1
σ
(
(1− τ)ατ 1−αα [βL1 + (1− β)L2] 1−αα − ρ
)
wi(t) =
1− α
α
Ki(t)
Li
r∗
c1(0) =
(
ρ
σ
+
(
1− 1
σ
)
(1− τ)r∗
)
a1(0) +
1− α
α
1
1 + x∗
1
L1
(1− τ)r∗A(0)
c2(0) =
(
ρ
σ
+
(
1− 1
σ
)
(1− τ)r∗
)
a2(0) +
1− α
α
x∗
1 + x∗
1
L2
(1− τ)r∗A(0)
A.4 Cobb-Douglas specification (multi-region model)
s∗i =
βiLi∑n
k=1 βkLk
r∗ = α
(
τ
n∑
k=1
βkLk
) 1−α
α
γ∗ =
1
σ
(
(1− τ)α
(
τ
n∑
k=1
βkLk
) 1−α
α − ρ
)
wi(t) =
1− α
α
Ki(t)
Li
r∗
ci(0) =
[
ρ
σ
+
(
1− 1
σ
)
(1− τ)r∗
]
ai(0) +
1− α
α
1
Li
(1− τ)r∗s∗iA(0)
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A.5 Derivation of (43), (44) and (45)
Because of the Euler equation the steady-growth rate is given by γ∗ =
1/σ((1− τ)r∗ − ρ). Then the comparative statics with respect to βi is
dγ∗
dβi
=
1
σ
(1− τ)dr
∗
dβi
. (A.12)
According to the equations (43) and (43), the equation (A.12) changes into
dγ∗
dβi
= −1
σ
(1− τ)f
′′(k∗)
f ′(k∗)
τ
(τ
∑n
k=1 βkLk)
2
d(
∑n
k=1 βkLk)
dβi
. (A.13)
By using assumption 1, d(
∑n
k=1 βkLk)/dβi in the equation (A.13) is rewritten
as:
d
(
n∑
k=1
βkLk
)
= Lidβi +
∑
j =i
Ljdβ¯,
=
(
Li − 1
n− 1
∑
j =i
Lj
)
dβi. (A.14)
Hence we can derive the equation (43) by substituting (A.14) into (A.13). 22
Let us next derive the equation (44). Totally differentiating the equation
(43), we obtain:
ds∗i
dβi
=
1∑n
k=1 βkLk
(
Li − s∗i
d(
∑n
k=1 βkLk)
dβi
)
(A.15)
Substituting (A.14) into (A.15), we then derive the equation (44). We can
obtain the equation (45) in a similar way.
22To derive (A.14) we use the condition
∑
k βk = 1⇔
∑
k dβk = 0.
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A.6 Numerical examples
This appendix shows the relationship between the possibility of a Pareto
improving policy and the labor population ratio L2/L1 in a two-region model
with numerical calculations. That is to say, we investigate the equation (33).
As mentioned above, on the right hand side, although dΦ(L2/L1)/d(L2/L1)
is ambiguous, Φ almost always increases in L2/L1 .
The specification of parameters is as follows:
α = 0.4, ρ = 0.01, a1(0) = 2, a2(0) = 1, τ = 0.5 in figure 4-6
α = 0.4, ρ = 0.01, a1(0) = 2, a2(0) = 1, β = 0.5 in figure 7-9
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Figure 4: β = 0.3
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Figure 5: β = 0.6
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Figure 6: β = 0.9
24
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0
0.
05 0.
1
0.
15 0.
2
0.
25 0.
3
0.
35 0.
4
0.
45 0.
5
0.
55 0.
6
0.
65 0.
7
0.
75 0.
8
0.
85 0.
9
0.
95 1
L2/L1
LH
S 
o
r 
R
H
S
RHS
LHS
Figure 7: τ = 0.3
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Figure 8: τ = 0.6
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Figure 9: τ = 0.9
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